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Introduction
This work analysis micro and macro aspect of applied fiscal policy issues and it is divided
in three chapters.
The aim of the first one is to investigate the extent to which local budget spending
composition reacts to fiscal rules variations. I consider the budget of Italian
municipalities and exploit specific changes in the Domestic Stability Pact’s rules, to
perform a difference-in-discontinuities analysis. The results show that not all rules are
equally effective: imposing a cap on the total amount of consumption and investment is
not as binding as two caps, one specific for consumption and a different one for
investment spending. More specifically, the consumption variation is triggered by
changes in the level of wages and services spending, while investment relies on
infrastructure movements. In addition, there is evidence that when an increase in
investment is achieved, there is also a higher budget deficit level.
The second chapter intends to analyze the extent to which fiscal policy shocks are
able to affect macrovariables during business cycle fluctuations, differentiating among
three intervention channels: public taxation, consumption and investment. The
econometric methodology implemented is a Panel Vector Autoregressive model with a
structural characterization. The sample includes 11 countries of the EMU using
quarterly data in the period between 1999 and 2012. The results show that fiscal shocks
have different multipliers in relation to expansion or contraction periods: output does
not react during good times while there are significant effects in bad ones.
The third paper attempts to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy announcements by
the Italian government on the long-term sovereign bond spread of Italy relative to
Germany. After collecting data on relevant fiscal policy announcements, we perform an
econometric comparative analysis between the three cabinets that followed one another
during the period 2009-2013. The results suggest that only fiscal policy announcements
made by members of Monti’s cabinet have been effective in influencing significantly the
Italian spread in the expected direction, revealing a remarkable credibility gap between
Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments with respect to Monti’s administration.
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Chapter 1
Fiscal rules and public spending:
Evidence from Italian municipalities
Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which local budget spending
composition reacts to fiscal rules variations. I consider the budget of Italian
municipalities and exploit specific changes in the Domestic Stability Pact’s rules, to
perform a difference-in-discontinuities analysis. The results show that not all rules are
equally effective: imposing a cap on the total amount of consumption and investment is
not as binding as two caps, one specific for consumption and a different one for
investment spending. More specifically, the consumption variation is triggered by
changes in the level of wages and services spending, while investment relies on
infrastructure movements. In addition, there is evidence that when an increase in
investment is achieved, there is also a higher budget deficit level.
JEL codes: C21, C23, H72, H74, H77.
Key words: Fiscal rules, Difference-in-discontinuities, Public spending, Consumption,
Investment, Deficit, Italian Municipalities.
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1.1 Introduction
Rules for coordinating the financial relationship among different levels of government
have the purpose of guaranteeing both macroeconomic stability and financial
sustainability. The rationale of fiscal rules stems from two main concepts. The first one
is the common pool problem, whereby the presence of imbalances financed by the
common pool of national taxes through central transfers generates an incentive for local
governments to excessively increase local expenditure (Rodden, 2002). The second
concept is related to the fact that whenever a local administration defaults, the national
level generally intervenes with transfers of more resources to the local level. This creates
an insurance effect and a problem of moral hazard.
In case of Italy, local governments are subject to financial distress. As shown in
Figure 1.1, in the period between 1989 and 2012 there are 460 municipalities where a
default occurred1. This situation creates social and financial instability at the local level
and might also affect the national level if the central government needs to reallocate
resources. Indeed, a recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights point in
this direction2. In fact, the Court states that when a m suffers financial distress, the
Central level has to guarantee for its debt refund. Consequently, fiscal rules play a central
role and their ability to affect budget decisions is crucial.
Beyond this, subnational rules could also be implemented with the aim of fostering
virtuous behaviors. Public spending can focus on consumption or investment. Ganelli
and Tervala (2010) affirm that the reallocation of consumption in favor of capital
spending might generate welfare gains. In the case of Italian municipalities, the amount
of consumption compared to investment spending has changed over time. As shown in
Figure 1, the overall consumption of municipalities was 3.96% of GDP in 1990, while
investment was 2.47%. The distance between these two types of spending subsequently
decreased in the following years: in 2005 consumption and investment reached 3.32%
1In addition, from the mid-1990s onwards, decentralized governments have made significant recourse
to financial tools such as derivatives, mainly Interest Rate Swaps. The number of municipalities that
had derivative transaction in 2007 was above 600 (as shown in the “Financial Stability Report” of Banca
d’Italia in 2013). They have been exposed to market volatility, which has generated potential liability
and, sometimes, financial distress. For instance, Milan signed a contract of derivatives for a total amount
of 1.5 billion Euro in 2005 and after a few years had to face a potential loss of 200 million Euro. For this
reason, the city of Milan called banks who proposed the transaction to court, arguing that the city had
been duped. Moreover, smaller Municipalities have come up against this issue, such as Alessandria and
Acqui Terme, who decided to stop paying their derivatives’ liabilities to banks.
2See the European Court of Human Rights “Case of De Luca vs Italy”, n. 43870/04 and the Il Sole
24 Ore’s article of the article of September 24th, 2013 entitled “La Corte Ue condanna l’Italia: i debiti
dei Comuni falliti vanno pagati”.
1.1. INTRODUCTION 11
Figure 1.1: Number of default of Italian Municipalities.
Note: The period considered is between 1989 and 2012, divided by Regions. Source: Corte dei Conti.
and 3.01% of GDP, respectively. However, starting from 2006 onwards, this trend has
reverted.
The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the extent to which public spending of
Italian municipalities is affected by fiscal rules. For this purpose, I exploit specific
aspects of the Institutional framework. Since 1999 the Italian Government has
implemented fiscal rules under the so-called Domestic Stability Pact (hereafter DSP), in
order to coordinate and control subnational budget balances. Peculiar features of the
DSP give the opportunity to study a natural experiment implementing a
difference-in-discontinuity technique.
This paper provides evidence that fiscal rules are not equally effective, but rather they
crucially depend on how they are designed. In particular, differences arise concerning
whether it is imposed a cap on the overall amount of public spending or if there are two
limits, differentiating between consumption and investment. In addition, this paper also
highlights the extent to which the budget composition reacts to fiscal rules. When a
reduction in consumption is imposed, there is a significant effect of the same sign on the
quantity of services offered,whereas while when an increase in investment is allowed, there
is a positive variation on the amount of infrastructure spending. Interestingly, there is
also a significant increase in the deficit level in the latter case.
This evidence shows the existence of a trade-off, whereby rules that favor investment
also cause deficit. The policy maker should take into account these design issues: on one
hand only certain rules are actually binding while, on the other hand, rules might have
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Figure 1.2: Spending of Italian municipalities.
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effects that go beyond the initial normative goal.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the related
literature, while section 3 analyses the normative framework. Section 4 provides the
preliminary analysis and section 5 shows the identification strategy. Sections 6 illustrates
the empirical findings, before section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Fiscal rules are generally justified because they substitute reputation when government
policy is discretionary and time-inconsistent.
In the case of subnational fiscal rules, the debate is controversial, with the theoretical
literature suggesting advantages and disadvantages. Authors such as Eichengreen and
von Hagen (2004) and Rodden (2004) are in favor of these rules, believing that the scope
for subnational fiscal rules is higher when there are severe fiscal imbalances, possibly
increased by the decentralization process. In fact, when more functions are delegated to
local governments, their spending power rises and imbalances might worsen. In addition,
local governments have incentives to free ride on fiscal discipline for different reasons:
they can rely on a common pool of national resources (Weingast, 2006); sometimes they
are “too big to fail” (Wildasin, 1997), and private creditors on the capital market expect
that central government will guarantee for local debts (Daﬄon, 2002). Milesi-Ferretti
(2004) argues against subnational fiscal rules, suggesting that local rules might lead to
“ugly outcomes” for local governments, such as creative accounting and window dressing.
Ter-Minassian (Ter-Minassian) affirms that fiscal rules should only be implemented if
financial markets or cooperative arrangements across government levels cannot enforce or
reach financial discipline.
From an empirical perspective, the DSP has captured the attention of different
authors. Patrizii et al. (2006) have addressed the ability of regions and local
governments to meet the DSP requirements, whereas Brugnano and Rapallini (2010)
evaluate the effects of the DSP on local public borrowing requirements from 1999 to
2005. Bartolini and Santolini (2009) conduct a panel data analysis on the current
expenditures of 246 Italian municipalities to capture the impact of the DSP on both the
opportunistic behavior of incumbent politicians and the yardstick competition. They
show that the introduction of the DSP significantly reduces the level of public spending
but strengthens the opportunistic behavior of incumbent politicians in pre-electoral
years. Other authors focus on the “effectiveness” approach, in dealing with the impact of
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fiscal rules on local administrations’s ability to achieve fiscal discipline and
sustainability. In particular, Balduzzi and Grembi (2010) implement a
difference-in-difference methodology on Italian municipalities considering the period
1999-2004 and show that the DSP has a positive and significant impact on current
expenditures and taxes’ revenues. Galli and Grembi (2010) focus the attention on
“special” municipalities3 between 1999 and 2000 using a difference-in-difference
approach. Their results show that the revenue side is affected when the DSP is imposed,
while there are not significant variations in relation to expenditures’ decisions. Grembi
et al. (2012) analyze Italian Municipalities between 1999 and 2004, implementing a
difference-in-discontinuities approach. They highlight that relaxing fiscal rules provokes
a deficit bias, shifting from zero to 2% of total budget, with this variation mainly driven
by adjustment on the revenue side.
With respect to the previous literature, this paper contributes to the effectiveness
branch of research. The novelty of this work stems from the analysis of specific fiscal
rules designed to influence local public spending (i.e. caps on the expenditure side of the
budget). It is shown that there are both effective and ineffective fiscal rules. Furthermore,
when investment spending increases, there is also a positive reaction in terms of the deficit
level.
1.3 Normative framework
Italian municipalities are subject to the Law for Local Authorities4, which states goals
and duties that have to pursue. Moreover, starting from 1999, the central government
has set the DSP in order to honor commitment taken with the European Institutions.
Since its introduction, the DSP has implemented different types of rules, particularly: a)
a balanced budget, whereby the total amount of revenues has to equal the total amount of
expenditures; b) expenditure caps, through which there might be ceilings on total current
expenditure or specific expenditure items; c) ceilings on local level revenues, which allow
the central government to limit local authorities’ ability to increase revenue; d) limits on
the stock of debt or the issuance of new debt; e) restrictions on the type of expenditure
that can be financed by debt, which usually state that only investment expenditure may be
financed through debt (known as “Golden Rule”), requiring a clear definition of investment
3Which are part of the so-called “special status” regions and provinces.
4Law n. 367/2000. In particular, the actual functions are presented by the DPR 167/1996 and cover
a wide range of subjects, such as general administration, justice, local police, public education (up to
primary school and part of secondary school), culture, sport, tourism, local public transportation, urban
development, social sector, economic development, productive local services.
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expenditure to avoid current expenditure being transferred to investments; f) indicators
of the ability to service the debt.
Considering that this paper aims to study the extent to which fiscal rules affect local
public spending, I am particularly interested in rules designed to have an impact on it.
The DSP has implemented this kind of rule twice. In particular, a cap on the total
expenditures was set in 2005, which could not be higher than the average spending of the
previous three years, augmented by 11.5%5. In the following year, the limit on the overall
spending was removed, while different ceilings on current and capital expenditures were
added. Consumption was the most penalized, with the rule imposing a cut of 6.5%. On
the other hand, investment was allowed to increase by 8.1%6. For the purpose of this
analysis, I should also highlight DSP rules in the year prior to the introduction of the
caps, because I am analyzing the variation of public spending from one year to the next.
Thus, in 2004 the DSP imposed the budget balance as target rule.
There is also another crucial element to consider, namely that the number of
municipalities subject to the DSP has changed over time. The Pact only constrained
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 2004 and 2006, while in 2005 the
threshold decreased to 3,000, as summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Fiscal rules imposed by the Domestic Stability Pact to Italian Municipalities.
Year Group A Group B Group C
t1 None None Budget balance
t2 None Total expenditure cap Total expenditure cap
t3 None None Consumption and Investment caps
Note. t1, t2 and t3 are respectively years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Group A, Group B and
Group C represent, respectively, municipalities with a population below 3,000, between
3,000 and 5,000, above 5,000 inhabitants.
This normative framework provides an opportunity to study the extent to which fiscal
rules can affect budget spending decisions at the local level through a natural experiment,
as described in the following sections.
5Further details are shown in the Finance law n. 311, December 30, 2004 and Document of Ministry
of Economy and Finance (“Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato”) n. 4 of February 8, 2005.
6For both consumption and investment the benchmark level is the one of two years previously. Further
details are shown in the Finance law n. 266, December 23, 2005 and Document of Ministry of Economy
and Finance (“Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato”) n. 8 of February 17, 2006.
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1.4 Preliminary analysis
The normative framework shows that the analysis should focus on the period between
2004 and 2006. Data concerning local budgets is derived from the Italian Ministry of the
Interior’s website7 and covets all Italian municipalities. The outcome of interest refers
to budget values, and particularly consumption and investment spending8. Values are
expressed in Euro per-capita and deflated using 2006 as the reference year.
The DSP is set at the national level, although the so-called “special autonomy”
provinces and regions are treated differently and therefore had to be excluded from the
sample9. The dataset also includes information from the National Institute of Statistics
about the geographical characteristics of municipalities10 which is useful when
robustness checks are implemented.
According to the institutional framework, municipalities are grouped in relation to
their number of inhabitants: Group A includes those with up to 3,000 people; Group B
between 3,000 and 5,000, and Group C above 5,000. Arguably, small and large
municipalities might have different behaviors in terms of budget policies and thus it
seems reasonable to limit the sample to municipalities with between 1,000 and 7,000
inhabitants11.
This preliminary analysis intends to explore consumption and investment spending to
provide an intuition of possible DSP effects, with the aim of highlighting different behavior
between the three groups during the examined period (2004, 2005 and 2006 are named t1,
t2 and t3, respectively). Subsequently, these findings will be further investigated through
the empirical analysis (see section 6).
7See http://finanzalocale.interno.it/.
8Consumption spending is divided into the following categories: Employees, Raw Material, Services
and Interests paid on Debt. Investment are detailed in Infrastructures, Goods for internal production,
Durable goods, Consulting services, Transfers and Credits. Expenditures are composed by a further
category which considers the amount of principal repaid on debt. Current budget revenues are divided in
the following categories: Taxes, Fees & Tarrifs, Current Central Transfers, Current Regional Transfers,
Extra-tributary revenues. Capital revenues are split into Alienations, Capital Central Transfers, Capital
Regional Transfers, Real estate transfers, Deficit (defined as new loans stipulated by the municipality as
shown in the balance sheet in “Titolo V - Entrate derivanti da accensioni di prestiti”.). All the budget
values represent the accrual basis of accounting.
9They have the power to bargain fiscal rules directly with the Central Government. Consequently,
municipalities of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the autonomous regions of Sicilia,
Sardegna, Valle D’Aosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia have not been considered.
10In particular: i) total surface of each Municipality in square kilometers; ii) altitude of the Town hall
in meters; iii) altitude zone: Inland mountain, Coastal mountain, Inland Hill, Coastal Hill, Plain; iv)
macro-area: Northwest (Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria), Northeast (Veneto, Emilia-Romagna), Centre (
Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio), South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria).
11The number of municipalities analyzed is 42% of the total.
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In t2, the DSP imposed a cap on total spending to municipalities with more than 3,000
inhabitants. The sum of consumption and investment increased for the non-constrained
group (Group A) by 2.8% from t1 to t2, while for Groups B and C it decreased by 2.3%
and 3.1%, respctively. Table 1.2 shows the budget values.
In t3, municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants had to face a different rule.
Instead of having just one cap on budget spending, there were two different caps: one
on consumption and another on investment. Interestingly, from t2 to t3, the constrained
group (Group C) reported a different trend in terms of budget composition compared to
the other groups, as shown in Figure 1.3. In particular, Group B reached a consumption
level that was 1.76 times the investment in 2006. By contrast, Group C did not increase
this relationship from t2 to t3. Such budget spending variation might be due to either
a consumption or investment change. Table 1.2 shows the mean budget values for each
group, highlighting that consumption changed between t1 and t3 by 1.5%, 0% and -4.5%
respectively for Group A, B and C, mainly due to variation in services. On the other
hand, investment changed by -6.3%, -20.4% and -15% for Group A, B and C, respectively,
mostly due to infrastructure spending12.
As a preliminary comment, there is evidence of a variation in the budget composition
during the analyzed period, with the three groups demonstrating different behaviors.
This can be due to fiscal rules imposed by the DSP, with the next section focusing on the
identification strategy to exploit this possibility accordingly.
1.5 Identification Strategy
The institutional framework analyzed in section 3 explained that decisions related to
the DSP rules are made by the central government, and are therefore exogenous with
respect to local dynamics. Specifically, I would like to assess rules designed to influence
budget spending, namely: (i) a total expenditure cap and (ii) consumption and investment
caps. For this purpose, I need to identify a treated and control group, and a treatment.
Considering Groups A, B, C and t1, t2, t3 as defined in the previous section, the analysis
involves two steps, each comprising two cases.
As shown in Figure 1.4, the first step focuses on Groups A and B, which are the
control and treated group, respectively, and the threshold is set at 3,000 inhabitants.
There are two cases in relation to the period analyzed. Case IA studies t1 and t2, where
the treatment is the imposition of the total expenditure cap to Group B, while Case IB
12Mean values have been tested using the t-test and groups have statistically different means at the
95% confidence interval.
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Figure 1.3: Level of Consumption over Investment spending.
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analyzes t2 and t3, whereby the treatment is the exemption from the total expenditure
cap for Group B.
Figure 1.4: Identification strategy, Case IA and Case IB
The second step relies on results from the first step (as shown in the next section) and
considers Group B and C, the control and treated group, respectively, with the threshold
set at 5,000 (see Figure 1.5). As before, there are two cases in relation to the period
analyzed. Case IB studies t1 and t2, where the treatment is the variation of the fiscal rule
from “Budget balance” to “Total expenditure cap” for Group C, while Case IIB analyzes
t2 and t3, whereby the treatment is the variation of the fiscal rules from “total expenditure
cap” to “consumption and investment caps” for Group C.
Figure 1.5: Identification strategy, Case IIA and Case IIB
The reminder of the section focuses on the formal approach used for the aforementioned
cases.
1.5.1 General setting
To assess the causal effect of each fiscal rule (the treatment) on the treated group, it
is necessary to consider a minimum set of assumptions to perform the analysis (Angrist
et al., 1996). Potential budget outcomes Y are the variables of interest and the actual
treatment D13 depends on the variable Z, which is equal to 1 when a municipality is
assigned to the treatment, while Z = 0 when it is assigned to the control group. The
potential budget outcome of municipality m at time t depends on Z and D, which can
13The actual treatment is assumed to be beyond the researcher control (Angrist et al., 1996).
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more formally noted as Ymt = Ym(Zt, Dt). Therefore, the outcome is Ymt(1) when the
municipality is treated and Ymt(0) when it is not. The following assumptions should be
considered:
(i) Stable unit treatment value assumption: the potential outcomes and treatments
of unit m are independent from the potential assignment, treatments and outcomes of
n 6= m. Consequently, when a municipality is subject to the treatment, it should not
influence the other one (no general equilibrium effects);
(ii) non-zero average causal effect of Z on D: the probability of treatment must be
different between the two groups. Therefore, it is required that whoever is assigned to the
treatment actually gets the treatment, or at least part of the component of the treated
group. In other words, some level of compliance is necessary14;
(iii) the exclusion restriction should hold. Consequently, the assignment only affects
the outcome through the treatment;
(iv) monotonicity. No one does the opposite of its assignment, regardless what the
assignment is. Thus, the absence of defiers is required. Specifically, a defier would be a
municipality that follows the DSP rules without any formal obligation;
(v) random assignment: all municipalities have the same probability of getting the
treatment.
It should be noted that assumption (v) cannot hold due to the fact that the assignment
is not random, but rather conditioned to the population level. In this case, a Sharp
Regression Discontinuity Design (SRDD) could be implemented, imposing the following
assumptions:
(vi) assignment to treatment must only depend on observable pre-intervention
variables (i.e. the population level);
(vii) identification of the mean treatment effect is only possible at the threshold;
(viii) the continuity of potential outcome: limits of the expected values have to be
identical at the cutoff. In other words, the budget outcomes of municipalities just before
and after the cutoff level should be equal.
Under these assumptions, the SRDD can be written as (Angrist and Pischke, 2008):
lim
δ→c
E[Ym|Pc < Pm < Pc + δ]− E[Ym|Pc − δ < Pm < Pc] = E[Ym(1)− Ym(0)|Pm = Pc]
where Pc is the population at the cutoff level, δ represents a small number, Ym and Pm
14In order to have a high compliance level, the DSP also introduces incentives. Patrizii et al. (2006)
show that municipalities are compliant to the DSP.
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are the potential budget outcome and population of Municipality m. The estimand of this
nonparametric estimation strategy is the average causal effect, E[Ym(1)−Ym(0)|Pm = Pc].
However, assumption (viii) raises some issues. In order to identify the causal effect at
the cut-off point, any discontinuity in the relationship between the outcome of interest and
the variable determining the treatment status must be fully attributable to the treatment
itself. However, there is a confounding discontinuity policy at the cut-offs, due to a
change in the wage level of local politicians. In fact, the three groups of municipalities
guarantee different wages in relation to the population level, with a jump at 3,000 and
5,000 inhabitants (exactly at the cutoffs). As shown by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013),
better-paid politicians are able to improve internal efficiency, sizing down the government
machine. Consequently, there is a confounding policy that might alter the identification
strategy. To overcome this issue, the approach described in the following subsection can
be implemented.
1.5.2 Difference-in-Discontinuities
The confounding policy that inhibits the effectiveness of the SRDD strategy is constant
over the analyzed period, and thus a Difference-in-Discontinuities (DiDisc) framework
can be implemented, as shown in Grembi et al. (2012)15. This allows studying the sharp
discontinuity at the threshold and, thanks to the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) design,
remove the constant confounding discontinuity policies (i.e. different wage policies among
municipalities). The assumptions that should hold are as follows:
(ix) the confounding discontinuity needs to be time invariant. This assumption requires
that the effect of wage variations on budget outcome among groups not to vary with time;
(x) the interaction between the treatment and the confounding discontinuity has to
be irrelevant. Therefore, different wage policies should not generate a different reaction
compared to fiscal rules introduced by the DSP.
Under these assumptions, there is an estimator φ̂ that identifies the local treatment
effect φ:
φ̂ ≡ ( lim
Pm↑Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t1]− lim
Pm↓Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t1])+
−( lim
Pm↑Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t0]− lim
Pm↓Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t0])
(1.1)
15This methodology combines the Difference-in-Difference strategy and a Regression Discontinuity
Design.
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where Ymt is the potential budget outcome for municipality m at time t, Pm is the
population level, t1 is the year of the treatment and t0 is the previous one.
For each case, the assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy Dmt which
takes the value:
Dmt =

0 if t = t0
0 if Pm ≤ Pc, t = t1
1 if Pm > Pc, t = t1
(1.2)
where Pc is the cutoff level. Having described the DiDisc strategy, we can now proceed
to the empirical model.
1.5.3 Empirical models
To estimate the DiDisc estimator I use two different methods16.
The first one is the “Local Linear Regression” (LLR) method, which fits the data with
linear regression functions in a specific sample range. The interval is limited considering
a certain distance “d ”, thus Pm ∈ [Pc − d, Pc + d]. The estimated model is:
Ymt =α0 + α1P˜m +Gm(β0 + β1P˜m)+
+ t1(γ0 + γ1P˜m +Gm(δ0 + δ1P˜m)) + mt
(1.3)
where Ymt is the budget outcome for municipality m at time t, P˜m is the normalized
population size (P˜m=Pm − Pc), Gm is a dummy equal to 1 when a city is part of the
treated group and 0 otherwise, t1 is the treatment year, α0 is the intercept and mt is the
error term. Considering that the treatment is Dmt = Gmt1, the coefficient δ0 is the DiDisc
estimator17
The second method is the “Spline Polynomial Approximation” (SPA), which relaxes
the linearity assumption of the previous method and uses polynomial functions of order η
to fit the relationship between the outcome of interest Ymt and the population level Pc18.
16See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Grembi et al. (2012).
17Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and results are controlled considering different
bandwidths.
18This is true on the right and left hand side of the cutoff level Pc and in the treatment year and
previous one, for each case analyzed. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robustness
checks are performed considering different functional orders.
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The estimated model is:
Ymt =
η∑
n=0
(αkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(βkP˜
η
m)+
+ t1[
η∑
n=0
(γkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(δkP˜
η
m)] + mt
(1.4)
where the variables and the DiDisc estimator are defined as in the LLR method.
1.6 Results
Empirical results are divided between the first (Case IA and IB) and second (Case IIA and
IIB) step and focus on consumption and investment spending budget outcomes, showing
the DiDisc estimator. The empirical models are represented by equations (3) and (4): the
LLR is performed at two different bandwidths, b=1,500 (LLR1) and b=1,300 (LLR2),
while the SPA is implemented at the second order of the polynomial.
The first step of the analysis is shown in Table 1.3. The effect of introducing a cap on
total spending for municipalities with a population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants
during the period t1 and t2 (Case IA) does not produce a significant effect on either
consumption or investment for any model specification. Moreover, moving forward of one
period (Case IB), and thus studying the effects when the cap is removed, also does not
provide any significant effects on both types of spending19.
It can be affirmed that the cap on the overall level of public spending is not capable
of significantly influencing the composition of the budget spending. Intuitively, the cap
was not sufficiently binding (as shown in section 3, the fiscal rule allowed for a maximum
increase of total spending of 11.5%, compared to the average of the previous three years)
and both groups reported a behavior that was not significantly different between each
other. Therefore, in this framework, the cap on overall spending is not effective and thus
it can be seen as a placebo treatment with no effect on budget outcome decisions. These
findings are confirmed by the graphical representation of the difference-in-discontinuity
approach. In fact, Figure 1.6 shows the difference between budget outcomes, generated
by the difference between t0 and t−1, between Group A and Group B. At the cutoff level,
19The effects are not significant, further deepening the analysis at subcategories of consumption
and investment (consumption: wages, raw material, services and interests paid on debt; investment:
infrastructures, goods for internal production, durable goods, consulting services, transfers and credits).
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Table 1.3: Domestic Stability Pact effects in Case I.
LLR1 LLR2 SPA
Case IA
Consumption 6.78 7.54 7.70
(9.32) (10.58) (11.54))
Investment 90.74 111.72 74.46
(68.40) (74.20) (93.21)
Case IB
Consumption 2.07 2.81 -5.59
(8.06) (9.31) (12.50)
Investment 4.62 -22.04 -85.55
(63.52) (65.61) (87.76)
Obs. 4,078 3,446 5,870
Note. Case I refers to Municipalities between
1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Case IA
considers t1 and t2 while Case IB analyzes t2
and t3. LLR1 and LLR2 are Local Linear
Regressor methods as in equation (3), with
a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation
method of order 2, as in equation (4), and
considers all the Municipalities. Values are
in Euro per-capita and deflated using t3
as reference year. Robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, at the 1% level by ***.
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there is a vertical line to highlight a possible discontinuity. Consumption does not show
any discontinuity at the thresholds, while the jump shown by investment is not significant.
Figure 1.6: Difference-in-discontinuities in Case I.
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Before showing the results, it should be noted that there are potentially two
contemporaneous treatment. In particular, in the period considered by Case IIA, Group
B is exempted from the DSP in t1 and subject to it in t2, while there is a variation of
the fiscal rule for Group C from “budget balance” to “total expenditure cap”. Moving
forward one period (Case IIB), Group B is no longer subject to the DSP in t3 and there
is a further variation from the “budget balance” to “consumption and investment caps”
for Group C. In order to disentangle these two treatments, we need to rely on the
evidence provided in the first step. The treatment assigned to Group B is claimed not to
be effective in both t2 and t3 and therefore in Case II the treatment is the fiscal rule
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variation for Group C. Consequently, Group B and C are the control and treated group,
respectively.
We can now focus on the results. Case IIA shows the effect of a variation of the fiscal
rule for Group C from the “budget balance” to the “total expenditure cap”. As shown
in the top part of table 1.4, there is no evidence for a significant effect of this variation.
This result provides evidence in the direction of the first step, with Case IA, Case IB and
Case IIA highlighting that the “total expenditure cap” does not have an impact in terms
of affecting budget spending composition.
The last analysis (Case IIB) shows the effect of introducing two different caps: one for
consumption and another for investment. As further explained in section 3, the fiscal rule
imposed a decrease in consumption and allowed for an increase in investment spending.
The bottom part of table 1.4 highlights that the outcome is consistent with the fiscal
rule aim: from t2 to t3 consumption diminished by 28 Euro per-capita, while investment
increased by 180 Euro per-capita. Considering subcategories of budget spending, there is
evidence that consumption variations are mainly due to movements in wages (+11 Euro
per-capita) and services (-35 Euro per-capita) spending. In terms of investment, the main
subcategory to vary is infrastructure, which accounts for 83.5% of the overall variation.
Considering that municipalities are only allowed to generate new debt20 to finance
investment spending, it seems reasonable to verify what happened to this specific category.
For this reason, Table 1.4 includes a row related to the deficit level for Case IIB. In line
with the Golden Rule, the variation of investment and deficit have the same sign and a
comparable magnitude, thus providing evidence that an increase in investment fosters a
higher deficit level.
The empirical findings are supported by Figure 1.7. In Case IIA the behavior of
Group 2 and Group 3 is substantially the same, while in Case IIB there is evidence of a
discontinuity due to a variation in services and infrastructure spending. In addition, this
is also confirmed by the jump in deficit spending.
1.6.1 Robustness checks
Smaller municipalities have, on average, a higher level of consumption and investment,
which might be due to geographical factors21.
In order to assess the results’ robustness, specific aspects of the municipalities are taken
20Which is named deficit, as explained in section 4.
21Municipalities situated on the mountains have different issues compared to those located in a plain
area, such as higher spending for street maintenance and costs related to the snow. In the empirical
analysis there are dummies to control for it.
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Table 1.4: Domestic Stability Pact effects in Case II.
LLR1 LLR2 SPA
Case IIA
Consumption 9.60 -2.05 4.69
(9.49) (12.62) (15.77)
Investment 4.44 6.70 -44.68
(80.13) (90.19) (119.15)
Case IIB
Consumption -27.97*** -23.03* -28.54*
(10.20) (11.84) (14.61)
Wages 11.03*** 12.93*** 10.73**
(3.00) (3.53) (4.40)
Services -35.40*** -34.05*** -37.22***
(6.72) (7.67) (9.49)
Investment 179.58*** 188.45** 193.83**
(69.04) (76.66) (93.59)
Infrastructure 149.97*** 164.44*** 171.69**
(54.03) (60.12) (73.21)
Deficit 103.22** 110.40** 141.07**
(41.28) (46.17) (56.96)
Obs. 1,880 1,618 2,728
Note. Case II refers to Municipalities between 3,000
and 7,000 inhabitants. Case IIA considers t1 and t2
while Case IIB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(3), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (4), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
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Figure 1.7: Difference-in-discontinuities in Case II.
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into account, including further peculiarities, as follows: (i) Surface (in Km2): different
territory extensions would likely require a dissimilar budget structure spending. For
instance, a wider area would probably include more paved roads and therefore involve
higher maintenance costs; (ii) Altitude level (in meters); (iii) Macro-areas dummies: Italy
is characterized by economical and cultural differences between the north, center and
south, therefore I control for North West, North East, Centre and South areas; (iv)
Geographical dummies: factors such as mountains, hills, plains and coasts might affect
spending choices; thus, the following dummies are also included: inland mountain, coastal
mountain, inland hill, coastal hill, plain.
The LLR model (3) becomes:
Ymt =α0 + α1P˜m +Gm(β0 + β1P˜m)+
+ t0(γ0 + γ1P˜m +Gm(δ0 + δ1P˜m)) + φX + mt
(1.5)
where X is a vector of the covariates and φ is a vector of the related coefficients. The
SPA model (4) becomes:
Ymt =
η∑
n=0
(αkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(βkP˜
η
m)+
+ t0[
η∑
n=0
(γkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(δkP˜
η
m)] + φX + mt
(1.6)
where X and φ are defined as in model (5).
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 confirm the main findings for the four Cases examined. The only
result that it is not robust is the wage variation: there are no significant effects of an
impact of the DSP on it.
1.6.2 Comments
Through the empirical analysis, it has been possible to show that the Domestic Stability
Pact is a vehicle for the central government to implement different kinds of local fiscal
rules. Specifically, the cap on total spending did not have a significant effect on the budget
composition either for municipalities that were not subject to the DSP the year before its
implementation (as shown in Case IA and Case IB) or those already constrained (Case
IIA). It is possible that the policy maker wanted to implement a more binding rule and for
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks in Case I.
LLR LLR Spline
(b=1,500) (b=1,300) (order 2)
Case IA
Consumption 3.21 4.78 2.28
(9.87) (11.09) (11.48)
Investment 56.86 74.74 37.72
(68.01) (73.31) (93.26)
Case IB
Consumption -2.09 -1.19 -8.66
(7.95) (9.22) (12.28)
Investment -35.89 -56.85 -115.28
(63.58) (66.02) (88.55)
Obs. 4,078 3,446 5,870
Note. Case I refers to Municipalities between 1,000
and 5,000 inhabitants. Case IA considers t1 and t2
while Case IB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(5), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (6), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table 1.6: Robustness checks in Case II.
LLR LLR Spline
(b=1,500) (b=1,300) (order 2)
Case IIA
Consumption 6.84 -4.86 4.42
(9.59) (12.74) (16.13)
Investment -26.75 -29.78 -77.15
(79.36) (89.42) (119.29)
Case IIB
Consumption -32.32*** -27.57** -29.68**
(10.44) (12.18) (15.03)
Wages 4.57 5.22 4.65
(2.90) (3.35) (4.21)
Services -30.57*** -28.19*** -30.33***
(6.76) (7.72) (9.61)
Investment 142.38** 144.22* 156.04*
(68.75) (76.37) (93.41)
Infrastructure 119.25** 127.30** 141.68*
(53.43) (59.36) (72.91)
Deficit 97.15** 102.67** 134.51**
(41.58) (46.48) (57.23)
Obs. 1,880 1,618 2,728
Note. Case II refers to Municipalities between 3,000
and 7,000 inhabitants. Case IIA considers t1 and t2
while Case IIB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(5), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (6), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
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this reason changed it in the following year (t3), imposing different caps on consumption
and investment spending. This new fiscal rule was able to significantly influence budget
composition, generating a negative variation in the amount of services provided by more
than 3% of the total budget, as well an increase in infrastructure spending by about 15%
(compared to the unconstrained municipalities).
1.7 Conclusions
Coordination rules between state and local government levels are fundamental to
guarantee overall sound public finance. Unsurprisingly, the European integration process
considers fiscal rules as a central subject for stability and growth purposes. This paper
studies the effects of the Domestic Stability Pact on Italian municipalities budget
composition and thanks to the peculiar framework that characterizes the Pact, has been
able to perform a natural experiment implementing a Difference-in-Discontinuity design.
The analysis provides two main contributions.
Firstly, there is a discrimination between effective and ineffective fiscal rules. What
emerges from the analysis is that the DSP is not effective per se, but rather the kind
of fiscal rule implemented is crucial. In fact, it has been shown that imposing a cap
on the overall level of current and capital expenditure does not affect budget decisions.
Interestingly, imposing separate caps on consumption and investment spending creates an
effective boundary, capable of affecting budget composition.
Secondly, effective fiscal rules do not equally affect all the types of spending. In
particular, imposing a cut on consumption generates a decrease in the amount of services
provided. Allowing for an increase in investment creates an increase in both infrastructure
spending and the deficit level.
Therefore, fiscal rules set at the national level are able to significantly affect spending
choices at the local level, both in statistical and economic terms. This evidence shows
the existence of a trade-off, whereby rules that favor investment also cause a deficit. The
policy maker should take into account these design issues: on one hand, only certain rules
are actually binding and, on the other hand, rules might have effects that go beyond the
initial normative goal.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal policy during good and bad time
in the EMU
Abstract
This chapter intends to analyze the extent to which fiscal policy shocks are able to affect
macrovariables during business cycle fluctuations, differentiating among three intervention
channels: public taxation, consumption and investment. The econometric methodology
implemented is a Panel Vector Autoregressive model with a structural characterization.
The sample includes 11 countries of the EMU using quarterly data in the period between
1999 and 2012. The results show that fiscal shocks have different multipliers in relation
to expansion or contraction periods: output does not react during good times while there
are significant effects in bad ones.
JEL classification: E62, H30.
Keywords: Fiscal policy, Consumption, Investment, Panel VAR, EMU, Business cycle.
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 37
2.1 Introduction
The ability of fiscal policy to stabilize the macro economy and smooth business cycle
fluctuation does not have, in the economic literature, an unanimous view. During the
last decades, different economic theories have been able to legitimize conflicting policies
(Blinder, 2004)1.
The sluggish of economic growth of the last years have generated an increasing
attention on the power of fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, with a particular
attention on the differences between expansion and recessions period. Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2011) estimate the effect of fiscal policies over the business cycle,
finding that they are more effective in recession than in expansions. Furthermore, a
recent IMF document titled “Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under
the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement”2 highlighted that multipliers have been miscalculated,
leading to a higher effect of austerity measure than previously expected. In fact, the
Fund predicted a contraction in Greece’s economy of 5.5% and an unemployment rate of
15%. However, the GDP contracted by 17% and unemployment raised up to 25%3.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the extent to which fiscal policy shocks are able to
affect macrovariables during good and bad times, differentiating among three intervention
channels: public taxation, consumption and investment. I implement a Panel Vector
Autoregressive model with a structural characterization of 11 EMU countries. There
is evidence that multipliers differs according to the business cycle: consumption and
investment shocks are not effective during expansions, but there is a significant effect
during a recession period, positive for consumption spending and negative for investment.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 review the related literature
and section 3 shows the data. Section 4 focuses on the econometric methodology, while
section 5 highlights the reaction of macrovariables triggered by fiscal shocks. Section 6
highlights the robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
1As described by Blinder (2004), the birth of fiscal policy may be dated in 1936 and until 1966 has
been dominated by Keynesian ideas which emphasized fiscal over monetary policy for fiscal stabilization
purposes, underlining the crucial role of discretionary action. During the following decade, in the US
economy the consensus about the ability of the fiscal policy to stabilize the economy collapsed (due to the
inflation followed by the heavy government spending for the Vietnam War). In the following years, when
the goal to reduce public debt was considered the most important, the use of fiscal stimulus policies was
not under discussion (the so called “Clintonomics”). On the other hand, since 2001, deficit expansions
and tax reduction were the main economic policies undertaken by George W. Bush.
2The document has been issued on the 5th of June 2013. To see the full text:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40639.0.
3Blanchard and Leigh (2013) investigate the relation between growth forecast errors and planned fiscal
consolidation during the crisis.
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2.2 Literature review
The theoretical background relies on two main different views: the Neoclassical and
Keynesian ones. The distinction between the two approach is based on different reaction
of macro variables to variations in government spending.
Starting from the Neoclassical literature, it is shown that private consumption and
real wage decreases when government spending increases, while employment augments.
This path is explained by models ascribable to Real Business Cycle family as shown by
Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005). In
these papers the agent’s wealth is reduced by an exogenous positive shock in government
spending through a lump-sum taxes. The effect is a decrease in the agent consumption
level, generating an incentive to increase the working time and therefore a fall in real
wage.
The Keynesian approach is built on a specific assumption: a government spending
rise generates an increase in private consumption. The works of Linnemann (2006), Ravn
et al. (2006) and Gali et al. (2007) are examples of this link, where the Keynesian behavior
is implemented using a modified utility function for which consumption and employment
are complements, a good-specific habit into a model with monopolistic competition or
a rule-of-thumb consumer into a model with nominal rigidities respectively. Taking into
account other macro variables, these papers agree that fostering public spending leads
to an increase in employment. However, there are discrepancies in the behavior of real
wages: while they increase for Linnemann (2006), the other two papers show an opposite
result. Clearly, the different assumptions made to build each model affect the results
provided. Due to the fact that, to a certain extent, different theories may be able to
explain conflicting results, the empirical evidence may help in the attempt to discriminate
among competing theories.
The empirical literature, once the benchmark reduced-form VAR model4 is set, differs
in relation to the approach chosen to identify the fiscal shock. There are four main
groups: first, Sims (1980) introduced the recursive approach which has been applied by
Fatás and Mihov (2001); second, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) proposes the Structural
approach where institutional information are taken into account, subsequently extended
in Perotti (2004); third, the sign-restrictions approach developed by Uhlig (2005) and
applied by Mountford and Uhlig (2009); forth, Ramey and Shapiro (1999) introduced the
event-study approach, also used by Edelberg et al. (1999), Eichenbaum and Fisher (2005),
Perotti (2007) and Ramey (2011).
4See section 3 for further details.
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The empirical evidence can be analyzed according to the Government budget
composition. Respect to tax shocks, most studies believe that unanticipated tax
increases have negative effects on output, as shown by Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Romer and Romer (2010), Baum and Koester (2011).
Thus, implementing different identification tools, they reach the same conclusion5. By
contrast, Perotti (2004) disagrees with these findings and suggests that output does not
react to tax shocks. In regards to spending shocks, the literature agrees that positive
spending shocks cause a persistent output increase. What happens on private
consumption? Unfortunately, the empirical evidence provides conflicting results, and a
final word able to discriminate between neoclassical and Keynesian views cannot be
written. In fact, a positive spending shock generates a positive and persistent reaction of
private consumption according to Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) and Perotti (2004), while Ramey (2011) predicts an opposite reaction. Other
authors, such as Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Edelberg et al. (1999), show that
private consumption response is not statistically significant and close to zero.
The recent literature that studies differences in government fiscal multipliers during
periods of slack refers, among others, to Owyang et al. (2013), who studies quarterly
data for US and Canada, finding that there is no evidence of different multipliers for the
US while they are substantially higher for the latter country. Furthermore, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) analyze US data
(both quarterly and annual) since 1985 and they find a multiplier near 0 during good
times and between 1.5 and 2 during recessions. In addition, Batini et al. (2012) examine
the multiplier in the US, Europe and Canada, suggesting that “smooth and gradual
consolidations are to be preferred to aggressive consolidations, especially for economies
in recession facing high risk premia on public debt”.
Respect to the existing empirical literature, the main contribution of this paper is
to assess the effect of fiscal shocks on macrovariables during business cycle fluctuations,
differentiating public spending shocks between consumption and investment.
2.3 Data
The data used in this study come from Eurostat and cover the period between the first
quarter of 1999 to the last quarter of 2012 for the 11 countries that have been part of the
5Romer and Romer (2010) implement a narrative approach which is similar to the event-study
approach.
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EMU since 19996. The main constrain in working with VAR in the fiscal policy context
is the availability of quarterly data and this issue is present also in this case. Eurostat
provides quarterly homogeneous data for EMU countries starting from 19997 and pooling
countries data together allows to have a higher number of observations. Therefore I
decided to perform a Panel VAR relying on overall 616 points for each variable. The fiscal
variables considered are three. In particular, on the revenue side there are data for direct,
indirect and social security taxes. Summing these three items up and subtracting transfers
generate net taxes, which represent one of the fiscal variables. On the expenditure side,
following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), I focus on government goods and services spending
(or consumption spending) and investment spending. The macrovariables of interest
are the same as in Perotti (2004), therefore Output, GDP deflator inflation rate (or
Inflation), 10-years nominal bond interest rate (or Interest rate). All the variables are
seasonally adjusted through Tramo-Seats specification8 and (excepted for Inflation and
Unemployment) in per-capita terms, deflated by the gdp deflator and in log.
In order to analyze the effects of fiscal policy during good and bad times I split the
sample in two parts: the first one represents the growth time and the second one the
recession time. Technically, a country is in recession after two consecutive quarters of
negative economic growth measured by a country’s GDP. Considering the 11 countries,
in the first quarter of 2009 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands and Portugal where in recession, while Spain here had the first negative
quarter and Luxembourg a positive one (after two negatives). The necessity to fix a
threshold equal for all the countries, brings to the fact that it seems reasonable to consider
the period between 1999 and 2008 as the expansion period (model 1, M1) and the period
between 2009 and 2012 as the recession one (model 2, M2)9.
2.4 Econometric methodology
The econometric methodology used to analyze fiscal policy shocks’ effects relies on Vector
Autoregressions (VAR) analysis, firstly introduced by Sims (1980). This technique had
6The EMU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
7See the Eurostat website: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/.
8The software used is Demetra, downloadable from the following webpage:
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/eurosam/info/data/demetra.htm.
9It should also be noticed that performing an analysis to verify the presence of structural change
through the Chow test, there is evidence of this circumstance.
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quickly become widely used, supplanting traditional Simultaneous Equations Systems10.
The VAR analysis may be divided in three different steps. The first one defines the
benchmark reduced-form VAR model, where the endogenous and deterministic variables
are specified. The second step transforms the reduced-form in a structural form, and the
third one identifies restriction in order to highlight the relevant innovations and impulse
responses. In the following subsections these steps are analyzed in greater details.
2.4.1 Reduced and Structural form
The starting point of the VAR analysis, considering that the analysis is based on 11 EMU
countries, is the benchmark reduced-form Panel VAR model, which includes the following
endogenous variables: the log of per-capita real government spending in good and services
gt (or consumption spending), the log of per-capita real government capital spending ct
(or investment spending), the log of per-capita real net revenues τt (defined as the sum
of government revenues from direct, indirect and social security taxes minus government
transfers), the log of per-capita real output yt, the GDP deflator inflation rate pit and the
10-year nominal interest rate it. The reduced-form model can be specified as follows:
yt = A(L)yt−1 + ut (2.1)
where yt ≡ [gt ct τt yt pit it]′ is a (6 × 1) vector of endogenous observable time
series variables, A(L) is (K × K) coefficient matrix, ut ≡ [ugt uct uτt uyt upit uit]′ is
a six-dimensional vector of reduced-form disturbances with E[ut] = 0, E[utu′t] = Σu
and E[utu′s] = 0 for s 6= t11. Quarterly dummies are not included because the data
are detrended. The model includes also countries fixed effect. Considering that data are
quarterly and one year period seems to be adequate for the analysis of fiscal policy shocks,
the number of polynomial lags is set equal to four12
The reduced-form VAR is a VAR model where impulse responses could be estimated
in order to recognize relations between the variables. However issues rise when it is needed
to interpret which set of impulse responses generate the ongoings in a given system, due
to the fact that the same underlying VAR produces different sets of impulses. Thus, to
10Sims (1980) strongly criticized the specification methodology of large scale macroeconomic models,
arguing that there were methodological weaknesses.
11It should be noted that the same framework is applied when youth unemployment is taken into
account. The difference is that this new macrovariable substitutes the 10-years bond interest rate one.
12This is the same number of lags used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). However, when robustness
checks are implemented, both a higher and lower number of lags are studied.
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classify the relevant innovations, it is required the identification of structural restrictions
through non-sample information.
Before focusing on structural restrictions and to overcome the issue that in general
reduced-form disturbances are correlated, the reduced-form VAR should be transformed
in a structural VAR, pre-multiplying equation (1) by the (kxk) matrix A0:
A0yt = A
∗(L)yt−1 +B0t (2.2)
where A∗ = A0A. This is the so-called AB-model13, where the relation between the
reduced-form disturbances ut and the structural shock t is described by:
A0ut = B0t (2.3)
The structural errors are assumed to be white noise with t ∼ (0, IK). A simultaneous
equations system is formulated from the errors of the reduced form, accounting for the
shift from specifying direct relations for the observable variables to formulating relations
for the innovations. The reduced form residual is obtained from equation (3) as ut =
A−10 B0t and therefore σu = A
−1
0 B0B
′
0A
−1′
0 .There are K(K + 1)/2 equations and 2K2
elements considering both matrices A and B. Setting the diagonal elements of A equal to
one, K elements are set. However, further restrictions are needed and, more specifically,
2K2 − K − [K(K + 1)]/2 restrictions should be set for identification purposes14. If no
restrictions are imposed in A0 and B0, the structural model is not identified. The following
subsection delineates the identification scheme implemented.
The reduced-form benchmark model is (1), as described in the previous section. To
correctly estimate a VAR process it is necessary to impose some assumptions on the
model behavior. A preliminary analysis should therefore be implemented to evaluate if
the required conditions hold, in order to derive the consistency and asymptotic normality
of the estimators. With this attempt, it is studied for each variable of the model whether
or not they follow a stable process. Implementing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test,
there is evidence that all variables (expect for Inflation and Interest rate in M1 and for
Inflation in M2) are integrated of order 1, therefore they are stationary after differencing
once. Even if a stationary process may be preferred for stability purposes, it should be
13For a given regression, I assume that the matrices A and B are invariant across time and countries.
14For further details about the AB-model see Lütkepohl (2005), chapter 9.
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considered that differencing could distort the relationship between the original variables
generating misleading results. The analysis of cointegration between the variables is
performed according to the rank and the maximum eigenvalue tests and there is not
an unequivocal result. Considering also the absence of peculiarities that shows a priori
long-run relationship among variables, it seems plausible not to impose any cointegrating
restriction. Consequently, the VAR is estimated with the variables entering in levels15.
In addition, the number of lags to be included in the benchmark VAR model has been
set in four (as specified in section 3). Checking this choice more formally, for Model 1
the AICC ans SBC/BIC tests suggest respectively six and two lags. For Model 2, these
tests suggest 2 lags. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the benchmark model is
constructed using four lags, but different numbers of lags are considered when robustness
checks are implemented.
2.4.2 Identification scheme
The identification scheme chosen to describe restriction relies on Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), subsequently expanded in Perotti (2004), who studied fiscal policy shocks effects
in the United States. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) used a three-variable VAR model,
including taxes, government expenditures and output, while Perotti (2004) used five-
variables, considering also inflation and interest rate. This methodology relies on a two-
step procedure. The first step is aimed to exploit institutional information about tax and
transfer systems and about the timing of tax collections. This piece of information is
used to evaluate cyclically adjusted taxes and government expenditure. The second step
estimates the effects of fiscal shocks through Impulse Response Function.
In order to perform the first step, the reduced form residuals of the fiscal variables
should be further analyzed. In particular, they may be seen as linear combination of
three components. The first one is the random discretionary shocks, which represents
the structural shocks to be estimated. However, there are other components that may
prevent the correct estimation. In fact, another component is represented by the
automatic response of taxes and government spending to innovations in the
macroeconomic variables (for example, an economic expansion would generate an
increase in taxes for given tax rates). The third component is the systematic
discretionary response of policymakers to macro innovations (i.e. variation in the tax
rates according to a recession or an economic expansion). In order to understand this
15The same process has also been followed by Giordano et al. (2008) and previously has been
theoretically supported by Sims et al. (1990).
44 CHAPTER 2. FISCAL POLICY DURING GOOD AND BAD TIME
point more in deep, it is useful to write down the equations that explain the relationship
between the reduced-form disturbances ut and the structural disturbances t, as follows:
ugt = αgyu
y
t + αgpiu
pi
t + αgiu
i
t + βgc
c
t + βgτ
τ
t + 
g
t (2.4)
uct = αcyu
y
t + αcpiu
pi
t + αciu
i
t + βcg
c
t + βct
τ
t + 
c
t (2.5)
uτt = ατyu
y
t + ατpiu
pi
t + ατiu
i
t + βτg
g
t + βτc
c
t + 
τ
t (2.6)
uyt = αygu
g
t + αycu
c
t + αyτu
τ
t + αypiu
pi
t + αyiu
i
t + 
y
t (2.7)
upit = αpigu
g
t + αpicu
c
t + αpiτu
τ
t + αpiyu
y
t + αpiiu
i
t + 
pi
t (2.8)
uit = αigu
g
t + αicu
c
t + αiτu
τ
t + αiyu
y
t + αipiu
pi
t + 
i
t (2.9)
Considering equations (4), (5) and (6), the structural fiscal shocks are represented
by gt , ct , τt . These shocks are mutually uncorrelated, but they are correlated with the
reduced form residuals16. In addition, the coefficients αjk capture the other two effects
previously described: the automatic elasticity of the fiscal variable j to the macroeconomic
variables k (i.e. y, pi and i) and the discretionary change in the fiscal variable j that the
policymaker implements in response to an innovation in the macroeconomic variables.
Therefore, equation (4) states that unexpected movement in government spending in
goods and services within a quarter may be due to innovation in the macroeconomic
variables or to structural shocks to the fiscal variables. The same is true for equations
(5) and (6). Equation (7) states that unexpected movement to Output within a quarter
may be due to innovation in the other macroeconomic variables or to a structural shock
of the Output. The same concept can be applied to equations (8) and (9).
How is it possible to disentangle the automatic and systematic discretionary
response of fiscal variables on macro innovations included in coefficients αjk? As shown
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), it is crucial to consider decision lags in fiscal policy
and institutional information about the automatic elasticity of fiscal variables to real
GDP, inflation and government bond interest rate. It has been noted that generally
policymakers take more than a quarter to enact discretionary measures in response to
innovation, due to the fiscal time needed to learn about the unexpected variations,
decide which is the correct decision to undertake, approve a new law through the
legislative body and implement it. Thus, it can be assume that this path takes more
than three months, which is the frequency of data used in this analysis. As a
consequence, it may be possible to affirm that αjk does not include the systematic
16Therefore, they cannot be studied by estimating an OLS of (4), (5) or (6).
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discretionary response, therefore only the automatic one is left in. External information
on the elasticity of taxes and spending to macro variables can be used to define the
coefficients of αjk for equations (4), (5) or (6). As a consequence, cyclically adjusted
fiscal shocks can be constructed as linear combination of the three fiscal structural
policy shocks, as follows:
ug,CAt ≡ ugt − (αgyuyt + αgpiupit + αgiuit) = βgcct + βgττt + gt (2.10)
uc,CAt ≡ uct − (αcyuyt + αcpiupit + αciuit) = βcgct + βctτt + ct (2.11)
uτ,CAt ≡ uτt − (ατyuyt + ατpiupit + ατiuit) = βτggt + βτcct + τt (2.12)
Focusing on the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form disturbances, it is
possible to set the coefficients of the automatic response of fiscal variables. I assume that
variations in Output are not able to affect either consumption or capital expenditure in
the same quarter17, therefore αgy = 0 and αcy = 0. Net taxes are assumed to increase in
relation to Output expansions, therefore ατy = 1. In addition, nominal current, capital
and taxes items are believed not to be affected by changes in the price level 18, therefore
the effect in real term is fixed as follows: αgpi = −1, αcpi = −1, ατpi = 1. Considering that
interest payments paid and received by the government are excluded from the definition of
spending and net taxes, αgi, αci, αti are set equal to zero. In order to identify the system,
further restriction should be made on the reduced-form disturbances. In particular, I
assume that the 10-years nominal interest rate can be affected contemporaneously by
shocks in output and inflation, and inflation can be affected contemporaneously by shocks
in output. This means, on the other hand, that in the same quarter the interest rate does
not affect output and inflation, while inflation does not affect output. However, after a
quarter the variables in the system can freely interact between each other. This set up is
also used to consider fiscal policy effects on youth unemployment, including this variable
in place of 10-years bond interest rate one19.
Focusing on the variance-covariance matrix of the structural disturbances, restrictions
should be made on fiscal policy shocks. In particular, I assume that government decision
17As noted by Giordano et al. (2008), the length of the procedures related to the majority of payments
does not allow that a change in real GDP affects expenditure in the same quarter.
18It is likely that when a contract is signed by the public administration, variations of the inflation do
not alter the nominal purchase in the same quarter. Considering net taxes, most of them are expressed
as percentage of the nominal price, therefore the inflation increases public revenues.
19It should be noted that this setting is equal for all the countries included in the analysis.
Manipulations of the benchmark coefficients are taken into account when robustness checks are
implemented, leading to minor variations in the results.
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on spending in goods and services are taken before the ones on spending in capital (βgc =
0). Moreover, decisions on spending are taken before decisions on revenue (βgτ = 0 and
βcτ = 0). Equations (10), (11) and (12) can be written as follows:
ug,CAt = 
g
t (2.13)
uc,CAt = βcg
c
t + 
c
t (2.14)
uτ,CAt = βτg
g
t + βτc
c
t + 
τ
t (2.15)
Summing up all the restrictions made on the parameters, it is possible to write the
following matrix, that shows the relationship between the reduced-form and the structural
disturbances:

1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 −1 −1 0
−αyg −αyc −αyτ 1 0 0
−αpig −αpic −αpiτ −αpiy 1 0
−αig −αic −αiτ −αiy −αipi 1


ugt
uct
uτt
uyt
upit
uit

=

1 0 0 0 0 0
βcg 1 0 0 0 0
βτg βτc 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1


gt
ct
τt
yt
pit
it

(2.16)
Having defined the setting of the reduced form VAR, it is possible to focus on how the
fiscal multiplier and error bands are constructed.
2.4.3 Fiscal multiplier and Error bands
There are different ways to compute the fiscal multiplier and therefore it may be useful to
specifically define how it is illustrated in this work. The fiscal multiplier is defined as the
change in Output caused by a one-unit increase in the fiscal variable at a certain forecast
horizon. It can be expressed as follows:
Multiplier(T ) =
∑T
t=0 ∆yt∑T
t=0 ∆ft
1
f/y
(2.17)
where yt is the response of Output at period t, ft is the response of the fiscal variable
at period t, f/y is the average share of the fiscal variable in Output over the sample
time span. In order to have the same kind of interpretation, I extend this approach
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also to the other macrovariables of interest. Results always show the median multiplier.
As usual in the literature, the “Impact Multiplier” (IM) is the multiplier when T=0.
I also consider outcomes at different point in times, therefore taking into account the
“Cumulative Multiplier”.
In addition to the multiplier structure, it is important to understand how the impulse
responses are generated, because they form the basis on which the multiplier is built.
In particular, they are constructed assuming a shock equal to one per cent of a certain
fiscal variable, considering its average share of Output over the sample time span. Only
one fiscal variable per time is being shocked. To evaluate whether a result is statistically
significant, error bands should be taken into account. Considering that Sims and Zha
(1999) point out that error bands corresponding to 0.50 or 0.68 probability are often more
useful than 0.95 or 0.99 bands20, it seems reasonable to use a lower and upper bands of
respectively sixteenth and eighty-fourth percentiles of the distribution of the responses at
each horizon21, which approximately coincides with the 0.68 probability level. Therefore,
an estimate it is claimed to be statistically significant when the error bands do not include
zero. Bands are measured using Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 iterations22.
Next subsections analyze the effects of a shock, respectively, in government
consumption, investment and net taxes.
2.5 The response of macroeconomic variables
The analysis of macrovariables reaction triggered by a shock of fiscal variables is detailed
in this section. In order to provide a clear representation of the outcome, there are also
figures of cumulative multipliers which allow to have an immediate view of the total effect
after a certain number of quarters. Furthermore, results are rescaled thus they can be read
as the effect of a 1% increase in the fiscal variable. Due to the fact that variables enter
in the system log (i.e. Consumption, Investment, Net taxes, Output) or in percentage
(i.e. Interest), it is possible to read the effects in percentage points’ variations of the
macrovariable.
20Because the latter ones do not generally have probabilities close to their coverage probabilities
21The same strategy to define the significance of the results has been followed by Giordano et al. (2007).
22I implemented the Montesvar procedure in Rats (created by Tom Doan), which is designed to estimate
Monte Carlo Impulse Responses for overidentified SVARs. For further details, see the following link:
http://econpapers.repec.org/software/bocbocode/rtz00119.htm.
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2.5.1 Government consumption shock effects
A shock in Government consumption, which is represented by an increase of 1% of
expenditures in goods and services, has different effects in relation to the considered
period.
During good times (see Figure 2.1, left column) the Output has an IM of -0.11
percentage points, reaching 0.09 in the 4th quarter and 1.32 in the 10th quarter, but they
are not statistically different from 0. Inflation reacts positively and significantly to an
increase in spending for goods and services (IM of 0.29), while decreases in the
subsequent quarters. Interest rate has an IM of -0.02 and this result decreases in the
following period, reaching -0.19 in the 4th quarter and -0.87 in the 10th quarter.
Considering the crisis period (see Figure 2.1, right column) results change substantially.
The reaction of Output is economically higher than the previous period and statistically
significant, having an IM of 0.09, which increases to 1.53 in the 4th quarter and to 4.34 in
the 10th quarter. Inflation has an IM slightly negative (-0.07), but it is already positive
after the first quarter (0.26), reaching 1.24 after 10 quarters. Interest rate does not react
to this shock.
2.5.2 Government investment shock effects
This subsection studies the effect of 1% shock in government investments. The scheme
used in the previous subsection is also followed here. I therefore start to analyze the
outcome of Model 1 (see Figure 2.2, left side), followed by results of Model 2 (see Figure
2.3, right side).
During good times, government investment shocks do not seem to have an impact on
macrovariables taken into account. In fact, the confidence intervals of output, inflation
and interest rate state that variation in investment does not lead to result statistically
different from zero.
During bad times, there are some variations in the outcome. In particular, analyzing
the effect on Output, the IM is close to zero (-0.01) and the CM after 4 and 10 quarters
are respectively -0.36 and -1.61. Inflation reacts positively, with an IM of 0.01 and a CM
of 0.05 and 0.16 after 4 and 10 quarters. Interest rate does not provide significant results.
2.5.3 Government net taxes shock effects
The third fiscal variable of the model is represented by net taxes. What are the effects of
1% increment in net taxes? As before, the analysis is divided between good (see Figure
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative multiplier triggered by a shock to government consumption.
(a) M1: Output (b) M2: Output
(c) M1: Inflation (d) M2: Inflation
(e) M1: Interest rate (f) M2: Interest rate
Note: The cumulative multiplier is at different quarters of Output, Inflation and Interest rate during
good (left side, M1) and bad (right side, M2) times. Blue lines represent the confidence interval based on
Monte Carlo simulations.
3, left side) and bad (see Figure 2.3, right side) times.
In the first case, a net taxes shock generates a decrease in output. The IM is equal
to -0.01 and the CM decreases in the following quarters, reaching -0.42 after 1 year and
-1.99 after 2 years. Subsequently, results become not significant. Inflation has the highest
multiplier after 2 quarters (0.15) and thereafter decreases and becomes not significant.
Interest rate react positively between the 6th and 8th quarter with a CM of respectively
0.23 and 0.35.
Considering the period between 2009 and 2012, output decreases until the 3rd quarter,
with a CM of -0.34. After that, results are not statistically different from 0. The level
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative multiplier triggered by a shock to government investment.
(a) M1: Output (b) M2: Output
(c) M1: Inflation (d) M2: Inflation
(e) M1: Interest rate (f) M2: Interest rate
Note: The cumulative multiplier is at different quarters of Output, Inflation and Interest rate during
good (left side, M1) and bad (right side, M2) times. Blue lines represent the confidence interval based on
Monte Carlo simulations.
of inflation increases until the 3rd quarter, with a CM equal to 0.15. Inflation does not
react to an increase in net taxes.
2.5.4 Comments
The analysis provided in the previous subsections shows that fiscal policy has an important
role in affecting macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, the effect is different whether it
is considered a good or a bad period. In fact, the benchmark model shows that during
good times a positive shock in the level of government spending for goods and services
has an effect on output not statistically different from 0, while during bad times there is
evidence of a significant positive effect. In fact the CM reaches, after 10 quarters, a level
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Figure 2.3: Cumulative multiplier triggered by a shock to net taxes.
(a) M1: Output (b) M2: Output
(c) M1: Inflation (d) M2: Inflation
(e) M1: Interest rate (f) M2: Interest rate
Note: The cumulative multiplier is at different quarters of Output, Inflation and Interest rate during
good (left side, M1) and bad (right side, M2) times. Blue lines represent the confidence interval based on
Monte Carlo simulations.
as high as 4.34. Therefore, it s confirmed the fact that fiscal policy affect the economy
differently in relation to the economic conditions.
The fact that in this study consumption and investment are treated separately allows
to compare their effects. In terms of output, it seems clear that consumption spending is
more effective in stimulating the economy than investment spending, in particular in the
period 2009-2012. In fact, the basic model shows a CM after 10 quarters of respectively
4.34 and -1.61.
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2.6 Robustness checks
In this section I intends to check the robustness of the results shown in the previously.
Firstly, I consider a variation in the fiscal variables’ order. In the benchmark model
government consumption is ordered first, followed by investment and taxes. Modifying
this assumption and imposing that taxes are chosen first, results still hold.
Secondly, the elasticity levels may be debatable and therefore I run the analysis with
different coefficients. Instead of assuming that net taxes increase in relation to output
expansions with an elasticity ατy = 1, I impose a higher rigidity level, therefore (i)
α′τy = 0.5. A further variation taken into account is the effect of inflation on fiscal
variables. The basic assumptions, as specified in section 3, are αgpi = −1, αcpi = −1,
ατpi = 1. In case contracts signed by the public administration can be bargained in
relation to inflation variations, it may be the case that a higher inflation rate does alter,
at least partially, nominal purchases, leading to (ii) α′gpi = −0.5 and α′cpi = −0.5. It could
also be true that public revenue has a higher level of rigidity respect to the benchmark
model, with (iii) α′τpi = 0.5. Implementing (i), (ii), and (iii), results still hold.
Thirdly, I consider different endogenous variables’ lags, generating new models with 5
and 3 lags. The findings that have been shown in the benchmark model mostly hold also
in these cases.
2.7 Conclusions
The ability of fiscal policy to stabilize the macro economy and smooth business cycle
fluctuation is a crucial issue in the literature. The sluggish of economic growth of the last
years have generated an increasing attention on this topic, particularly in relation to the
power of fiscal policy to stimulate the economy during a recession.
This paper analyzes 11 EMU countries considering three fiscal intervention channels:
consumption, investment and net taxes, focusing on the effects on output, inflation and
10-years bond interest rate. Furthermore, there is a comparison between the pre-crisis
and crisis period, in order to assess whether there are remarkable differences in the fiscal
policy intervention power.
Results show that an increase in consumption spending generate a higher positive
stimulus on output during bad times. Investment spending during the economic downturn
produce a negative output variation. Either a shock in consumption or in investment
spending generates an increase in the inflation rate during the crisis. (higher in the first
case). In relation to a positive variation in net taxes level, output decreases up to 8
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quarters in the pre-crisis years and up to 3 quarters considering the period 2009-2012.
This evidence may have some policy implications. In case the national public
authorities intends to stimulate the economy through a fiscal stimulus during an
economic downturn, it seems that an increase in net taxes is not the right tool. On the
other hand, public spending may be an engine for output growth, in particular through
consumption spending, but this generates also an increase in inflation.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal Policy Announcements of Italian
Governments and Spread Reaction
during the Sovereign Debt Crisis
(with Matteo Falagiarda)
Abstract
This paper attempts to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy announcements by the Italian
government on the long-term sovereign bond spread of Italy relative to Germany. After
collecting data on relevant fiscal policy announcements, we perform an econometric
comparative analysis between the three cabinets that followed one another during the
period 2009-2013. The results suggest that only fiscal policy announcements made by
members of Monti’s cabinet have been effective in influencing significantly the Italian
spread in the expected direction, revealing a remarkable credibility gap between
Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments with respect to Monti’s administration.
JEL codes: E43, E62, G01, G12
Keywords: Fiscal policy announcements, sovereign debt crisis, GARCH models
55
56 CHAPTER 3. FISCAL POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
3.1. INTRODUCTION 57
3.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis challenged the ability of national governments to guarantee
economic stability and the sustainability of sovereign debt. There is empirical evidence
that countries that do not have sound public finance, such as substantial fiscal deficit or
an excessively high debt level, are likely to face higher risk premia required by financial
market’s participants (Schuknecht et al., 2009). Since 2009 the spread between long-
term government bond yields in some euro area countries vis-à-vis the German ones
experienced not only a dramatic increase, but also an augmented differentiation among
countries. Recent contributions show that the determinants of the recent widening of
sovereign bond premia in euro area countries are related to both general factors, such
as liquidity risk, international risk aversion and contagion effects, and country-specific
factors, such as fiscal positions and macroeconomic fundamentals (Attinasi et al., 2009;
Gerlach et al., 2010; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Giordano et al.,
2013)
Showing that a major part of sovereign spread changes in euro area peripheral countries
was not related to increases in debt-to-GDP ratios, De Grauwe and Ji (2012) argue that
the recent movements of government bond yield differentials cannot be explained using
only economic and financial determinants. They show that the surge in the spreads
of Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain in the period 2010-2011 was not linked to the
underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios, but was connected to negative market
sentiments.
A factor that could play an important role in shaping sovereign spread movements is
political communication. Although a formal definition seems to be difficult to provide,
Denton and Woodward (1990) and McNair (2011) define, in a broad sense, political
communication as a discussion about the allocation of public resources with a particular
emphasis on the purpose and intentionality of political actors in affecting the political
environment. This includes discussions that are public and therefore could be related,
for instance, to public speeches, interviews and press releases. Clearly, mass media play
a crucial role in transmitting political communication and thus making them public
knowledge (Gade et al., 2013). A provocative question made by The Economist in 2011
in an article titled “Loose lips sink the euro?"1 has increased the attention on the effects
of political communication in the context of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.
The effects of statements made by politicians on financial markets have been the
focus of many recent studies. Carmassi and Micossi (2010) analyze critical changes in
1The Economist, 16th of September 2011.
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the 10-year government bond spread of Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and France versus
Germany between December 2009 and June 2010, pointing out that communications by
governments have fueled the financial turmoil. The messages by policy-makers were not
able to convince the markets about their ability to effectively address economic
imbalances. Mohl and Sondermann (2013) analyze news agencies report from May 2010
to June 2011, finding that a higher level of statements’ frequency from different euro
area governments generated an increase in the bond spreads. In addition, they find that
statements from AAA-rated countries’ politicians have had a significant impact on
sovereign bond spreads. The main finding is therefore the fact that political
communication mattered substantially during the financial crisis. Goldbach and
Fahrholz (2011) analyze whether political events that worsened the credibility of the
Stability and Growth Pact have generated a shared default risk premium for euro area
countries. They show that the European Commission has played an important role in
affecting investors’ evaluations. The effects of ECB communications about
unconventional monetary policy operations on the Italian spread during the recent
sovereign debt crisis has been studied by Falagiarda and Reitz (2013), who find that the
announcements of these measures have been able to reduce substantially Italian
long-term government bond yield spread relative to German counterparts. Gade et al.
(2013) investigate the extent to which political communication, defined as
“policy-makers’ pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance", had an impact on
the sovereign bond spreads in euro area countries, showing that this effect is evident in
Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
This paper intends to study the effects of political announcements by Italian
government’s members on the perceived sovereign risk of Italy, measured as the
differential between the Italian 10-year government bond yield and the German one. As
depicted in Figure 3.1, the Italian spread has experienced very high volatility between
2009 and 2013, increasing from around 140 basis points at the beginning of 2009 to more
than 500 basis points at the peak of the sovereign bond crisis at end of 2011, and then
declining to about 220 basis points at the end of 2013. As already mentioned, the
volatility of sovereign risk is potentially connected to the ability of governments to
address their duties in terms of sound public finance and debt obligations, and,
particularly, to provide credible long-term prospects. The recent Italian political
experience motivates an intriguing comparison among the three different cabinets that
followed one another during the period 2009-2013: Berlusconi’s cabinet, in office until
the 12th of November 2011, Monti’s cabinet, in office until the 27th of April 2013, and
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Letta’s cabinet. Therefore, it seems natural to conduct a comparative econometric
analysis to assess the effectiveness of announcements by members of the three different
administrations.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of the Italian spread vis-à-vis Germany (2008-2013)
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Source: Data from Thomson Reuters-Datastream.
Our definition of announcement is consistent with Gade et al. (2013) and includes
policy-makers’ public pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance. In order to
collect and classify announcements, we rely on the ECB Real Time Information System,
which includes news media releases from the following agencies: Bloomberg, Reuters,
Dow Jones Newswires and Market News International. Overall, our dataset consists of
197 announcements by Italian government members. We examine their effects on spread
movements by using GARCH models to control for time-varying volatility. The findings
indicate that only fiscal policy announcements made by members of Monti’s cabinet have
been effective in influencing significantly the Italian spread in the expected direction,
revealing a remarkable credibility gap between Berlusconi’s and Letta’s government with
respect to Monti’s administration. Moreover, we check the robustness of the results by
changing the set of controls and by using both the Italian CDS and the Italian 10-year
government bond yields as dependent variables.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset
and the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the results. Robustness checks are
conducted in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Empirical Analysis
3.2.1 A Fiscal Policy Announcement Indicator for Italy
Data on fiscal policy communications are obtained through the ECB Real Time
Information System, which includes news media releases from the following agencies:
Bloomberg, Reuters, Dow Jones Newswires and Market News International. In
particular, we collect any announcement from Italian government members regarding
fiscal policy and public finance from 2009 to 2013. Each announcement is judged in
order to assess the direction of its effects on the Italian spread vis-à-vis Germany, and
thus to determine the extent to which an announcement has its intended effects. Fiscal
policy announcements are classified according to their content, and then coded on a
numerical scale as follows:
FISCt =

+1 if the announcement is perceived to increase the spread
0 if the announcement is perceived to be neutral
−1 if the announcement is perceived to reduce the spread
(3.1)
Negative (positive) values are assigned to announcements that are perceived to reduce
(increase) the spread, whereas a zero is assigned to announcements that are perceived
as neutral. Since this approach of classifying fiscal policy announcements is necessarily
subjective, several double checks from the authors have been performed separately to
avoid misclassification.
To give some examples, the following announcements are classified as potentially able
to reduce the spread:
“ [. . . ] the Italian government is working on adding an article to the country’s
constitution requiring a balanced public budget." (Giulio Tremonti, Ministry of
Finance, 4 August 2011)
“ [. . . ] there are many proposals aimed at cutting Italy’s towering 1.9 trillion
Euro in government debt, and our priority is to stabilize current public
finances." (Mario Monti, Prime Minister, 29 December 2011)
“ [. . . ] Italy’s exit from the European Union’s excessive deficit procedure is
a priority for the country and will it give it more leeway in pushing forward
growth-boosting measures." (Enrico Letta, Prime Minister, 21 May 2013)
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The following announcements are instead classified as expected to increase the Italian
spread:
“ [. . . ] I am not concerned about increasing Italy’s already large public debt to
help the rising numbers of unemployed hit by the global economic downturn."
(Silvio Berlusconi, Prime Minister, 31 March 2009)
“Letta’s administration suspended all key economic decisions pending a clear
backing from the parties in the governing coalition. [. . . ] There is no guarantee
of government and parliamentary continuity." (Letta’s office, 28 September
2013)
Overall, our fiscal policy announcement indicator includes 197 announcements from
Italian government members over the period 2009-2013: 23 in 2009, 26 in 2010, 84 in 2011,
33 in 2012 and 31 in 2013. We identify 118 announcements by members of Berlusconi’s
cabinet, 53 by members of Monti’s cabinet, 26 by members of Letta’s cabinet. Lastly,
we also collect fiscal policy announcements related to Italian fiscal policy and public
finance coming from domestic sources other than the government (Italian parliament,
Bank of Italy, trade unions, industrial associations, etc.) and external sources (European
Commission, European Council, ECB, foreign governments, IMF, rating agencies etc.).
These statements are classified in the same way as domestic government announcements
and are used as control variables in the estimation exercises.
3.2.2 Econometric Model
In order to investigate the effect of fiscal policy announcements on the Italian spread, we
need a tool capable of modeling the high time-varying volatility of the spread
highlighted in Figure 3.1. Therefore, a standard Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model, originally proposed by Bollerslev (1986), is adopted.
The conditional mean of the model is an augmented autoregressive process:
∆St = α + β∆St−1 + γFISCt + δ∆Xt + εt, (3.2)
where ∆St is the first difference of the spread between Italian and German 10-year
government bond yields (Gerlach et al., 2010; Attinasi et al., 2009; Arghyrou and
Kontonikas, 2012), FISCt is our fiscal policy indicator, calculated as explained in the
previous subsection, and Xt is a vector of controls. Let the error process be such that
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εt = νt
√
ht, where νt is an i.i.d. sequence with zero mean and σ2ν = 1. The conditional
variance of εt is modeled as an ARMA(1,1) process:
ht = c+ aε
2
t−1 + bht−1. (3.3)
Consistently with previous works on the determinants of sovereign spreads, the vector
of control variables Xt contains: a) A volatility index for the euro area (V IXt) to control
for financial turmoil, as in Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) and Glick and Leduc (2012).
We expect a positive relationship between ∆St and ∆EuroV IXt. b) The total stock
market index for the EU (EUDSt) to control for market-wide business climate changes
in the EU, as in De Bruyckere et al. (2012). We expect a negative sign for the coefficient
of EUDSt in the model. c) The TED spread (TEDt), calculated as the three-month
LIBOR rate less the US Treasury bill rate, to control for perceived credit risk in the
global economy, as in Gerlach et al. (2010). The expected sign of the coefficient of this
variable is positive. d) The credit default swap (CDS) of Greece (CDSGreecet) to control
for the turbulences due to the Greek sovereign crisis. We expect a positive relationship
between this variable and the Italian spread. e) A dummy variable to control for ECB non-
standard monetary policy measures, extending the list of events reported by Falagiarda
and Reitz (2013). f) Weekday dummies to control for seasonality. g) Lastly, we also use
as controls any announcement related to the Italian fiscal policy situation coming from
domestic sources other than the government and external sources, such as the European
Commission, the ECB, other governments, international institutions and rating agencies.
Parameters are estimated by (quasi-) maximum likelihood using the Broyden, Fletcher,
Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS) numerical algorithm with robust standard errors. The
model is estimated using daily data, collected for the period 01:01:2009-31:12:2013. Details
on the data are reported in the Appendix.
3.3 Results
The goal of the paper is to check whether the effect on the Italian spread of fiscal policy
announcements of the three cabinets that followed one another during the period 2009-
2013 differs. To this purpose, the estimation is carried out over three different periods:
a) 1 January 2009 - 12 November 2011 (Berlusconi’s cabinet); b) 13 November 2011 - 27
April 2013 (Monti’s cabinet); c) 28 April 2013 - 31 December 2013 (Letta’s cabinet).
Table 3.1 reports the parameter estimates of the GARCH model as in equation (3.2)
and (3.3). For each administration, we specify four different models by adding
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progressively additional control variables. Ljung-Box (LB) Q-statistics are computed to
test for autocorrelation in standardized and squared standardized residuals. The
p-values of the calculated LB-Q values show that the null hypothesis of
no-autocorrelation up to five and ten orders cannot be rejected. Moreover, the estimated
coefficients of the variance equation are statistically significant at conventional levels,2
revealing clustering and long memory of the spread volatility. Therefore, the GARCH
model is reasonably specified.
Turning to the estimates of the mean equation, we find that the sign of the control
variables is generally as expected and their coefficients are, in most cases, statistically
significant. For example, changes in the European risk measure EuroV IXt are always
positively and significantly (at the 1% percent level) related to the Italian government
bond spread during Berlusconi’s and Letta’s administrations, whereas during Monti’s
administration the coefficient is significant only in the first two specifications. The
results also suggest some contagion effects from the Greek government debt crisis during
the years of Berlusconi’s administration. There seems to be no influence from Greece
during the other two periods. In contrast, an improved business climate (EUDSt) is
associated with a significant reduction of the Italian spread, at least during the first two
administrations considered. Lastly, the Italian spread reacts positively to changes in the
global risk measure TEDt only under Letta’s cabinets.
By considering our fiscal policy indicator, we observe that its coefficients during
Berlusconi’s administration are found not statistically significant. By contrast, the
announcements made by members of Monti’s cabinet seem to have had a significant
effect on the Italian spread in the expected direction in all the model specifications.
Lastly, the coefficients of the fiscal policy indicator under Letta’s period is negative and
significant, except in the third specification. Therefore, our results indicate that
announcements by members of Monti’s cabinet have been much more effective in
influencing the Italian spread in the expected direction, whereas announcements made
under the other two governments are found to be ineffective or even moving the spread
in an unexpected direction like under Letta’s administration. These findings highlight a
remarkable credibility gap between Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments with respect to
Monti’s administration.
2The estimates are not reported here, but are available upon request.
64 CHAPTER 3. FISCAL POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS
Table
3.1:
P
aram
eter
estim
ates
-
Italian
spread
B
erlusconi’s
cabinet
M
onti’s
cabinet
L
etta’s
cabinet
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
C
onstant
−
0
.0
4
9
−
0
.0
4
4
0.023
0.015
−
0
.0
0
2
0.012
0.316
0.319
−
0
.2
8
8
−
0
.2
8
8
−
0
.2
3
0
−
0
.3
0
8
∆
S
t−
1
0
.2
3
2 ∗∗∗
0
.2
1
5 ∗∗∗
0
.2
0
9 ∗∗∗
0
.2
1
4 ∗∗∗
0
.1
5
3 ∗∗∗
0
.1
5
8 ∗∗∗
0
.1
7
0 ∗∗∗
0
.1
7
2 ∗∗∗
0.111
0.114
0.107
0.122
∆
E
u
r
o
V
I
X
t
1
.1
6
7 ∗∗∗
1
.0
6
6 ∗∗∗
0
.6
6
5 ∗∗∗
0
.6
7
2 ∗∗∗
4
.6
6
8 ∗∗∗
4
.6
5
1 ∗∗∗
0.668
0.692
2
.7
6
9 ∗∗∗
2
.7
6
9 ∗∗∗
2
.0
8
9 ∗∗∗
2
.0
0
2 ∗∗∗
∆
C
D
S
G
r
eece
t
−
0
.0
1
6 ∗∗∗
0
.0
1
4 ∗∗∗
0
.0
1
4 ∗∗∗
−
0.000
0.000
0.000
−
0.000
0.000
−
0
.0
0
0 ∗∗∗
∆
E
U
D
S
t
−
−
−
0
.0
4
3 ∗∗∗
−
0
.0
4
3 ∗∗∗
−
−
−
0
.4
6
8 ∗∗∗
−
0
.4
6
9 ∗∗∗
−
−
−
0
.0
7
0
−
0
.0
5
4
∆
T
E
D
t
−
−
−
−
0
.0
7
0
−
−
−
−
0
.2
1
4
−
−
−
0
.8
4
0 ∗∗
D
o
m
G
o
v
t
−
0
.0
2
6
0.043
−
0
.1
3
2
−
0
.1
5
9
4
.7
5
3 ∗∗
4
.7
6
9 ∗∗
3
.3
7
8 ∗∗
3
.2
6
9 ∗∗
−
1
.9
0
1 ∗∗
−
1
.8
1
5 ∗∗
−
1
.6
4
0
−
1
.5
8
1 ∗
L
og-L
ikelihood
−
2
2
3
7
.3
1
−
2
2
2
1
.1
5
−
2
2
1
2
.6
6
−
2
2
1
1
.4
8
−
1
4
2
9
.0
0
−
1
4
2
8
.6
3
−
1
3
7
8
.9
1
−
1
3
7
8
.6
0
−
5
2
4
.7
6
−
5
2
4
.7
0
−
5
2
3
.1
3
−
5
2
0
.3
9
Q
(5
)
0.178
0.052
0.067
0.070
0.070
0.074
0.095
0.094
0.097
0.098
0.089
0.094
Q
(1
0
)
0.583
0.327
0.371
0.386
0.301
0.313
0.429
0.434
0.422
0.419
0.397
0.431
Q
2
(5
)
0.746
0.660
0.614
0.560
0.919
0.912
0.571
0.547
0.566
0.568
0.550
0.542
Q
2
(1
0
)
0.362
0.383
0.404
0.364
0.734
0.707
0.381
0.363
0.425
0.427
0.413
0.356
O
bservations
747
747
747
747
381
381
381
381
177
177
177
177
N
ote:
G
A
R
C
H
(1,1)
regressions
of
daily
basis
point
changes
in
the
spread.
***
(**,
*)
indicates
statistical
significance
at
the
1
(5,
10)
percent
level.
R
obust
standard
errors
are
used.
Q
(5
)
and
Q
(1
0
)
is
the
statistical
significance
of
the
L
jung-B
ox
Q
test
for
the
autocorrelations
of
the
standardized
residuals
up
to
the
5th
and
10th
order,
respectively.
Q
2
(5
)
and
Q
2
(1
0
)
is
the
statistical
significance
of
the
L
jung-B
ox
Q
test
for
the
autocorrelations
of
the
squared
standardized
residuals
up
to
the
4th
and
12th
order,
respectively.
B
erlusconi’s
cabinet:
1
January
2009
-
12
N
ovem
ber
2011.
M
onti’s
C
abinet:
13
N
ovem
ber
2011
-
27
A
pril
2013.
L
etta’s
cabinet:
28
A
pril
2013
-
31
D
ecem
ber
2013.
3.4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 65
3.4 Robustness checks
To check the robustness of the results, we first estimate the model using the CDS of
Italy (CDSt) as dependent variable instead of the spread. The results, reported in Table
2, confirm what we have previously found about Berlusconi’s and Monti’s governments.
However, in this case announcements made by members of Letta’s cabinet are no longer
significant at conventional levels.
Lastly, we run the same regressions using the Italian 10-year government bond yield
(Yt). Four lags of the new dependent variable are added to remove autocorrelation of the
residuals3. The results are displayed in table 3. The same conclusions can be drawn here.
The coefficients relative to Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments are found not statistically
significant, whereas announcements made by members of Monti’s cabinet have been able
to substantially influence the sovereign risk of Italy in the expected direction.
3.5 Conclusions
The study carried out in this article highlights the importance of political
communication in influencing sovereign bond spreads. Specifically, we focus on Italian
policy-makers’ public pronouncements on fiscal policy and public finance, relying on
news media releases from the following agencies: Bloomberg, Reuters, Dow Jones
Newswires and Market News International. We perform an econometric comparative
analysis between the three Italian cabinets that followed one another during the period
2009-2013, assigning a negative (positive) values to announcements that are perceived to
reduce (increase) the spread, whereas a zero is assigned to announcements that are
perceived as neutral. The results suggests that during Berlusconi’s administration fiscal
announcements are found to be not statistically significant. By contrast, the
announcements made by members of Monti’s cabinet seem to have had a significant
effect on the Italian spread in the expected direction. Lastly, the coefficients of the fiscal
policy indicator under Letta’s period is either negative or not significant. Therefore, our
results indicate that announcements by members of Monti’s cabinet have been much
more effective in influencing the Italian spread in the expected direction. These findings
highlight a remarkable credibility gap between Berlusconi’s and Letta’s governments
with respect to Monti’s administration.
3For the sake of brevity, only the coefficient of the first lag is reported.
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Appendix: The Data
Data on fiscal policy communications are obtained through the ECB Real Time
Information System, which includes news media releases from the following agencies:
• Bloomberg
• Reuters
• Dow Jones Newswires
• Market News International
Financial daily data are obtained from the Thomson Reuters-Datastream database:
• Long-term bond yield for Italy: Italy Benchmark Bond 10 YR - Redemption Yield
(Datastream mnemonic: ITBRYLD)
• Long-term bond yield for Germany: Germany Benchmark Bond 10 YR -
Redemption Yield (Datastream mnemonic: BDBRYLD)
• EuroVIX: VSTOXX volatility index (Datastream mnemonic: VSTOXXI)
• Total stock market index for the EU: EU-DS Market (Datastream mnemonic:
TOTMKEU)
• TED spread: TED spread rate - middle rate (Datastream mnemonic: TRTEDSP)
• CDS Greece: Greece Senior 10 Year Credit Default Swap (Datastream mnemonic:
GRGVTSX)
Data on ECB non-standard monetary policy events are collected using the dataset in
Falagiarda and Reitz (2013), which has been extended to include measures announced in
2013.
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